Die Beitrage des Sammelbandes widmen sich aus theologisch-philosophischer Perspektive der historischen Rezeption und der systematischen Relevanz des Freiheitsstreits zwischen Martin Luther und Erasmus von Rotterdam. Im systematischen Zentrum steht das jeweilige freiheitstheoretische Verstandnis des Menschen, seiner epistemischen und voluntativen Vermogen und seines metaphysischen Ortes innerhalb der Schopfung, besonders sein Verhaltnis zu Gott. Aus historischer Perspektive wird die Rezeption von Luthers Freiheitsbegriff durch Leibniz, Kant, Hegel, Schelling und in der analytischen Philosophie untersucht. Mit Beitragen von Christine Axt-Piscalar, Frank Dettinger, Thomas Frisch, (...) Volker Gerhardt, Friedrich Hermanni, Amit Kravitz, Jorg Noller, Wolfhart Pannenberg, Birgit Recki, Georg Sans SJ, Ruben Schneider und Gunther Wenz. (shrink)

The article analyzes volume 19, 1793, of Neueste Critische Nachrichten, in which an anonymous review of Kant’s Religion within the boundaries of mere reason was published. Evidence is presented to establish that the review was authored by Samuel Bernhard Wilcke, a young lecturer at the University of Greifswald, who passed away the following year. After examining Wilcke’s Essay of invitation to his lectures on Kantian philosophy, the review itself is commented upon. Finally, the reviewer’s critique is related to Kant’s reply (...) in the Preface to the second edition of the Religion. (shrink)

Die Selbstzweckformel des kategorischen Imperativs gebietet, einen Menschen jederzeit zugleich als Zweck, niemals bloß als Mittel zu gebrauchen. Gerold Prauss zufolge hätte Kant genauer zwischen nicht bloß als Mittel, sondern zugleich als Zweck? und gar nicht als Mittel, sondern nur als Zweck? unterscheiden sollen. Die erste Formel beschreibe ein Rechts¬verhältnis zwischen zwei sich gegenseitig anerkennenden selbstbestimmten Subjekten; die zweite Formel hingegen beziehe sich auf Situationen, in denen mir ein auf Hilfe angewiesenes vernünftiges Wesen gegenübertritt. Lediglich in dem zweiten Fall verdiene (...) die sittliche Pflicht moralisch genannt zu werden. Die Abhandlung zeichnet Prauss' Überlegungen zum Verhältnis von Recht und Moral sowie zur Rolle des säkularen Staats bei deren Verwirklichung nach und bewertet sie als überaus anregenden Versuch, der kantischen These von der für sich selbst praktischen Vernunft einen systematischen Sinn zu verleihen.The categorical imperative, in the formula of humanity as end in itself, demands to use every person always at the same time as end, never merely as a means. According to Gerold Prauss, Kant should have distinguished more carefully between 'not merely as a means, but at the same time as end' and 'not as means at all, but only as end'. Whereas the first formula describes a legal relationship between two self-determining subjects who mutually recognize one another, the second formula applies to situations in which I face a rational being that depends on my help. For Prauss, only in the second case the ethical duty deserves to be called moral. The paper traces Prauss' considerations regarding right and morals as well as regarding the role played by the secular state in their realization. These considerations are discussed as an extremely stimulating attempt to make sense of the Kantian thesis that reason is practical of itself. (shrink)

In his treatise On Intellectual Knowledge, Matteo Liberatore compares some «modern philosophical systems» to the «theory of S. Thomas». However, by examining thoroughly Liberatore's criticisms of the modern doctrine of ideas, his presentation of Descartes, Locke and Kant — the most prominent representatives of modern thought -is shown to be inadequate. Firstly, neither Locke nor Kant accepted Descartes' claim regarding the epistemic primacy of the «I think». Further, it does not seem that ideas, or representations, for either of them did (...) constitute the direct objects of knowledge. Finally, Liberatore is mistaken in maintaining that modern philosophers did not distinguish between intellect and sensibility. As a result, the differences between Liberatore's Neo-Thomism and the modern theory of ideas are less profound than he suggests. (shrink)

Na primeira analogia da experiência, o locus classicus da sua teoria da substancialidade, Kant introduz a substância como algo que permanece através do tempo, como para compensar a alteração dos estados de consciência. O conflito de interpretações a propósito desta questão é provocado sobretudo pela questão de saber até que ponto Kant identifica este substrato permanente de todas as manifestações com a matéria no sentido físico do termo. Nesse sentido, o autor do presente artigo desenvolve um argumento em ordem a (...) mostrar que, segundo Kant, apenas os objectos materials que ocupam espaço podem possuir o estatuto de substância (enquanto fenómeno). Para além disso, no entanto, mostra-se também que o critério da permanência temporal não exaure o conceito de substância. Com efeito, o artigo demonstra até que ponto Kant suplementa a noção de permanência mediante a sua compreensão da substância como sujeito de causalidade e de acção. Esta concepção está presente não apenas na sua metafísica da natureza, mas estende-se também à nossa própria auto-compreensão enquanto seres vivos capazes de agir em liberdade. /// In the first analogy of experience, the locus classicus for his theory of substantiality, Kant introduces substance as something that endures through time, as though to compensate for changing states of consciousness. The conflict of interpretations concerning this issue is provoked above all by the question as to whether Kant identifies this permanent substrate of all appearances with physical matter. This article argues that, according to Kant, only material objects that occupy space can possess the status of substance (as phenomenon). However, it also contends that the criterion of temporal permanence does not exhaust the concept of substance. Kant supplements permanence by means of his understanding of substance as the subject of causality and action. This conception is not only echoed in his metaphysics of nature, but extends to our selfunderstanding as living and freely acting beings. (shrink)

When Christiaan Huygens prepared the 1686/1687 expedition to the Cape of Good Hope on which his pendulum clocks were to be tested for their usefulness in measuring longitude at sea, he also gave instructions to Thomas Helder to perform experiments with the seconds-pendulum. This was prompted by Jean Richer's 1672 finding that a seconds-pendulum is 1 1/4 lines shorter in Cayenne than in Paris. Unfortunately, Helder died on the voy¬age, and no data from the seconds-pendulum ever reached Huygens. He nevertheless (...) did receive data from his clocks on the return-voyage from the Cape of Good Hope to Texel. When he first calculated the ship's course according to these data, it appeared to have gone straight through Ireland. He then tried introducing a correction to the data, based on an idea he had previously entertained as a possible explanation of Richer's finding: he corrected the observed time to com¬pen¬sate for a reduction in the effect of gravity from the Poles to the Equator resulting purely from the Earth's rotation. His newly calculated course convinced him that this rotational effect is the sole source of any variations in gravity with latitude. This paper examines Huygens's correc¬tions to the data and his reasoning from the new course to the conclusion that nothing else causes a variation in gravity. In the process, we show that Huygens had cogent empirical reasons to reject Isaac Newton's theory of universal gravity, which predicted a some¬what larger variation in gravity. (shrink)

This is a documentary study that presents: background on the debate between Hegel and Schleiermacher that parallels the writing of Hegel's preface to Hinrichs' work; the entire text of Hinrichs' Religion in Its Internal Relationship to Systematic Knowledge; plus appropriate introductions, annotations, a glossary, and a transcription of the German critical edition of Hegel's Hinrichs-Vorwort on which the new translation is based.

After a generous introduction to the subject, essays follow on transcendence and spirituality from a multidisciplinary and multifaith perspective: a focus on Abrahamic, Oriental, and African religions, a study of transcendence in Nazism, etc.

Philosophical (p-) zombies are constructs that possess all of the behavioral features and responses of a sentient human being, yet are not conscious. P-zombies are intimately linked to the hard problem of consciousness and have been invoked as arguments against physicalist approaches. But what if we were to invert the characteristics of p-zombies? Such an inverse (i-) zombie would possess all of the behavioral features and responses of an insensate being yet would nonetheless be conscious. While p-zombies are logically possible (...) but naturally improbable, an approximation of i-zombies actually exists: individuals experiencing what is referred to as “anesthesia awareness.” Patients under general anesthesia may be intubated (preventing speech), paralyzed (preventing movement), and narcotized (minimizing response to nociceptive stimuli). Thus, they appear—and typically are—unconscious. In 1-2 cases/1000, however, patients may be aware of intraoperative events, sometimes without any objective indices. Furthermore, a much higher percentage of patients (22% in a recent study) may have the subjective experience of dreaming during general anesthesia. P-zombies confront us with the hard problem of consciousness—how do we explain the presence of qualia? I-zombies present a more practical problem—how do we detect the presence of qualia? The current investigation compares p-zombies to i-zombies and explores the “hard problem” of unconsciousness with a focus on anesthesia awareness. (shrink)

Recent experimental evidence indicates that intuitions about inherence and system justification are distinct psychological processes, and that the inherence heuristic supplies important explanatory frameworks that are accepted or rejected based on their consistency with one's motivation to justify the system.